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UNDERSTANDING THE CHOICE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING OF EARLY STAGE COMPANIES: A
COMMENT ON BARRY AND TURKI
by
RonaldJ. Gilson'

This Comment considers the results of Barry and Turki's research data that indicates that investments perform differently depending on whether innovation is financed by private or public equity investment. The Comment posits two hypotheses
for the dfferential performance. The first highlights ex ante differences between
private and public subsamples, that is that the financing choice separates good
prospects from bad. The second hypothesis focuses on ex post differences in performance that results from differences in governance structure and incentives created by the structure of public and private equity investment. The ex ante separation hypothesis and the ex post performance hypothesis are not necessarily
mutually exclusive; the datapresented by Barry and Turki are consistent with either or both hypothesis.
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INTRODUCTION

In the vocabulary of empiricists like Christopher Barry and Adel
Turki, the papers presented at the Northwestern School of Law Forum
on Financing Innovation and now collected in this volume of The Journal
of Small and Emerging Business Law, divide into two distinct subsamples.

One subsample is comprised of analytic papers that seek to explain phenomena whose characteristics are based largely on intuition and assump-

Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, and
Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University School of
Law. I appreciate the comments of Christopher Barry and Adel Turki, and those of
the participants at a conference on Financing Innovation, sponsored by the Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College.
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tions about what the world is really like.' The second subsample is empirical; real evidence is presented of what the world is actually like.
Simple observation of the two subsamples demonstrates that the distribution of the forum papers among the two subsamples is not random.
It is skewed toward the analytical and away from the empirical by a factor
of some seven to one. Even with a sample this small, I expect the difference is statistically significant.
For my purpose, the significance of the difference, and the special
contribution of Christopher Barry and Adel Turki's article Initial Public
Offerings by Developmented Stage Companies, lies in the complementarity
between analytical and empirical research. In the end, those of us who
adopt as our task explaining why institutions and patterns of economic
activity take the form they do are dependent upon the empiricists to uncover the objects of our inquiry. The problems on which we focus become dramatically richer as empiricists increase our knowledge of what
actually happens in the world. In turn, analysis made more sophisticated
by empirical efforts gives rise to more interesting hypotheses for further
empirical testing, and then further analytical refinement.
The Barry and Turki article illustrates this important interaction.
Their article provides significant data concerning the returns to investors in development stage companies that fund their activities through
initial public offerings (IPOs). We learn that returns on investments in
two samples of development stage companies-one composed of biotech
companies and one composed of development stage companies in other
industries-dramatically underperfom the market whether or not performance is adjusted for risk. This data give rise to a very interesting
puzzle concerning the capital market's operation with respect to the subject of this forum: the choices available to early stage companies seeking
to finance their innovations. In my comments, I want to flesh out this
puzzle, and suggest how additional empirical work might further increase our understanding of the operation of this important market
segment.
To see the puzzle, remember that an IPO is not the only financing
source for early stage companies. Financing may also be obtained from
venture capital limited partnerships that invest in a portfolio of early
stage companies using funds provided by passive investors, typically institutions. s These funds, which in 1996, for example, raised approximately
$6.5 billion in new investment, reportedly have earned very substantial

The classic comment at this point is that the lawyer's definition of data is the
plural of anecdote.
2

Christopher B. Barry

& L. Adel Turki, InitialPublic Offerings by Development Stage
L. 101 (1998).

Companies, 2J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus.

3 For example, in 1995 pension funds, banks and insurance companies, and endowments and foundations accounted for 78% of the venture capital funds raised in

the United States. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capitaland the Structure of CapitalMarkets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47J FIN. ECON. 243, at tbl.2 (1998).
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returns, which presumably accounts for the growth of funds under their
management.' Comparing the returns on early stage investments by venture capital funds with Barry and Turki's data on the performance of development stage IPOs reveals a fascinating contrast.
*

"

Private equity (venture capital) investments in early stage technology companies appear to perform quite favorably on a portfolio basis.
Public equity (IPO) investments in early stage technology companies appear to perform quite poorly on a portfolio basis.

The puzzle is to explain the apparent empirical regularity: investment performance differs dramatically depending on whether innovation is financed by private or public equity investment.
Barry and Turki do not entirely ignore this issue. Early in their article they suggest that development stage companies seek public financing
because commercializing a new technology may require hundreds of
millions of dollars.5 Venture capitalists, Barry and Turki argue, could not
make such large investments without unduly concentrating their investments. Thus, only the public equity market can fund development projects of this size.
A number of problems confront this analysis. First, the IPOs in the
Barry and Turki sample simply are not large enough to create a portfolio
concentration problem. The mean and median gross proceeds from
their biotechnology sample IPOs were $11.6 million and $7.1 million,
respectively, and the largest offering was $99 million. The figures were
somewhat smaller for the non-biotechnology sample. The mean and
median gross proceeds of this sample were $9.8 million and $5.1 million,
respectively, and the largest offering was $52 million.6 Given the practice
of syndicating venture capital investments among a number of participants, 7 and the staging of early venture capital investments-that is, the
funding of only a portion of the capital the business plan discloses as
necessary to complete the project, with decisions about subsequent funding delayed until specified milestones are met-the size of IPOs in each
sample seem well within the funding capacity of the private equity market.

6

Id
Barry & Turki, supra note 2, at 102.
Barry & Turki, supra note 2, at tbl.1.
Joshua Lerner, The Syndication of Venture CapitalInvestments, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16

(1994).
a Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50J. FN. 1461 (1995). Because staging operates as a means to reduce risk by in-

creasing the opportunity for and intensity of monitoring, the data show that the earlier in the development process the first venture capital investment occurs, the
greater the total number of rounds of financing.
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Second, even if the amount of capital sought determined whether
recourse is to the private or public equity markets, the difference in returns that underlies the puzzle remains. Why should investments in large
development projects systematically outperform investments in smaller
development projects?
I will offer here two alternative hypotheses for the differential performance of private and public equity investments in development stage
companies. The first focuses on potential ex ante differences between the
private and public subsamples. The idea is that the choice of financing
serves to separate good prospects from bad prospects. The second hypothesis focuses on potential ex post differences in performance that result from differences in the governance structure and corresponding incentives created by the structure of public and private equity
investments. In this analysis, the difference in performance results from
the financing decision. Both hypotheses pose another and more difficult
puzzle: How can the performance differential between private and public investments in development stage companies represent an equilibrium? Why would any one buy the shares offered in the initial public offering of a development stage company? Analysis of this second level
puzzle moves the ball back into Barry and Turki's empirical domain, to
see if further inquiry can begin to sort things out.9
II.

THE EXANTE SEPARATION HYPOTHESIS

Imagine that we have a population of development stage companies
composed of good and bad prospects. The ex ante separation hypothesis
posits that venture capitalists are better at choosing the good prospects
from the mixed pool of investment candidates, thereby relegating the
bad prospects to the public equity market. The logic underlying the hypothesis seems at least plausible. The general partners of venture capitalist limited partnerships are specialists in selecting from among thousands of proffered business plans the few that have the highest potential
to succeed. In contrast, underwriters of IPOs are less specialized and
presumably less effective at differentiating among early-stage high technology companies. To be sure, we do observe underwriters, like Hambrecht & Quist and Montgomery Securities, who specialize in high technology and biotechnology underwriting and are presumably quite
skillful in selecting high quality clients. However, the skills of highquality, specialized underwriters do not seem to figure prominently in
the performance of Barry and Turki's samples of IPOs. Their samples,

9 I should note that Barry and Turki have already begun this task. See Christopher B. Barry & L. Adel Turki, Development Stage IPOs as a Vehicle for Financing
Innovation, paper presented at the Columbia Law School/Sloan Foundation Conference on Financing Innovation (Dec. 12, 1997).
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especially the non-biotechnology sample, are characterized by low quality underwriters.'0
The hypothesized difference in evaluative expertise between general
partners of venture capital funds and the underwriters of development
stage IPOs is reinforced by the differing incentives of venture capital
general partners and development stage underwriters. The structure of
venture capital limited partnerships aligns the incentives of the general
partners who select the investments and the limited partners who provide the funds. The bulk of the general partner's compensation depends
on the performance of the partnerships' investments; the general partner receives a percentage of the proceeds when an investment is made
liquid and the proceeds distributed to the limited partners." In contrast,
underwriters of firm commitment IPOs earn a fixed fee payable on the
closing of the offering. The
underwriter has no direct stake in the is2
suer's future performance.
One further step completes the structure of the separation hypothesis. Skill differentials can explain why venture capitalists can identify the
good prospects. But we still have to explain why the good prospects prefer private equity investments. What do venture capitalists provide that
the public equity markets do not?
In the private equity market, the venture capitalist makes important
non-capital contributions in addition to capital contributions. The venture capitalist also provides, management consulting-like services, monitoring services, and services as a reputational intermediary. 13 These noncapital contributions increase the probability of the development project's success and, hence, increase the project's expected value. Since the
returns to both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur depend on
the project's success, the venture capitalist's promise to provide valuable
services as well as capital is both attractive to the entrepreneur and
credible.
III. EXPOSTPERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES
The second hypothesis is that the different post-transaction governance structures of venture capital-backed and IPO-backed-private equity-backed and public equity-backed-firms influence subsequent firm
10

Barry & Turki, supra note 2, at tbl.1.

" Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture Partnerships Agreements, 39 J. L. & ECON. 463 (1996); William A. Sahlman, The
Structure and Governance of Venture CapitalOrganization,27J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990).
" The underwriter may have some indirect stake in the post-performance per-

formance of the companies that they take public because of the operation of a reputation market. See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, Capital Raising Underuniting
and the CertificationHypothesis, 15J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
" See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 3; Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman,
What Do Venture CapitalistsDo?, 4J. Bus. VENTURING 231 (1989).
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performance. Under this hypothesis, venture capital investments have
higher returns than investments in development stage IPOs because venture capital-backed companies have more effective governance structures.
Investing in development stage companies presents three critical
contracting problems. First, precisely because the company is at an early
stage, great uncertainty exists concerning future performance; most of
the important decisions bearing on the company's success remain to be
made, and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome
of the company's efforts remain unresolved. Second, the same factors
make for enormous information asymmetries between potential investors and entrepreneurs, as intentions and ability are far less observable
than actions already taken. Finally, the breadth of4 future managerial decisions creates potentially very large agency costs.

The post-investment governance structure of venture capital-backed
companies is carefully structured to address these problems. Venture
capital investments are typically staged, with funding decisions keyed to
the milestones set out in the business plan. Because the venture capitalist has the right, but not the obligation, to fund subsequent stages of development, the structure gives the investor a valuable option to abandon.
In turn, the existence of the option to abandon both gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive to perform and, by the entrepreneur's acceptance of the intensity of the incentive, reduces the information asymmetry concerning the company's future performance and the
entrepreneur's type.15
Additionally, the structure of the venture capitalist's investments
carries with it control rights disproportionate to the investor's equity.
The venture capitalist receives at least significant board representation
and often board control, usually has the effective power to replace a
portfolio company's chief executive officer, and receives extensive approval rights over important operating decisions through covenants in
the investors rights agreement. 6 During the period of their operation,
these disproportionate control mechanisms give the venture capitalist
powerful monitoring tools. And because disproportionate control terminates on a firm commitment public offering above a specified price, the
arrangement gives the entrepreneur an important incentive. In effect,
the entrepreneur receives a call option on the disproportionate control
given the venture capitalist exercisable on the company's success (as
measured by an investment banker's willingness to underwrite an initial
public offering)."

"4Paul A. Gompers, An Examination of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
'5

Gompers, supra note 8.
& Gilson, supra note 3; Gompers, supra note 14.
Black & Gilson, supra note 3.

,G Black
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Another element of the post-transaction governance structure acts
directly on the entrepreneur's equity holding. The entrepreneur is typically required
to accept a staged vesting requirement on some of all of
18
their stock. Coupled with the venture capitalist's disproportionate control, vesting creates a powerful performance incentive. Because of the
venture capitalist's monitoring capacity, the strength of the incentive is
consistent with Paul Milgrom and John Roberts' incentive intensity principle which counsels that high intensity incentives should be accompanied by a significant investment in monitoring to avoid incentive induced agency costs.'9
Now compare the post-transaction governance structure following a
development stage IPO. The governance structure not only does not operate to mitigate problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry and
agency costs, it exacerbates them. The sale of shares to dispersed investors creates the standard Berle-Means problem with no mechanism to
respond to it.2° In contrast to the venture capitalist's active involvement
with a portfolio company, and the techniques to align the investors' and
entrepreneurs' incentives, the underwriter has no post-transaction role
in the issuer's operation. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a worse governance structure to respond to the contracting problems posed by investing in a development stage company.
The ex post performance difference hypothesis follows from the differences in governance structures between venture capital portfolio
companies and development stage IPO issuers. Governance influenced
performance and the good governance structures associated with venture capital investments improve the post-transaction performance of
portfolio companies.
The ex ante separation hypothesis and the ex post performance hypothesis are not necessarily alternatives. The difference in portfolio quality between companies accessing the private and public equity markets
that result from the venture capitalist's skill at selecting the best prospects may be widened by the assistance provided by the venture capitalist
after the investment. The data presented by Barry and Turki are consistent with either or both hypotheses.2 l
'a Michael

J.

Halloran et al., Making Portfolio Company Investments, in VENTURE

CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION (Lee F. Benton et al. section eds., 1998).
'9

PAUL MILGORM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT,

ch. 7 (1992).
" Although Barry & Turki do not provide data on the distribution of share ownership following a development stage IPO, there is reason to think that institutional
ownership-a potential counter to the Berle-Means problem, is low. See discussion
infra p. 128.
" Alon Bray & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long Run Underperformance
of InitialPublic Offering; Evidence from Venture and Non-Venture Backed Companies, 52 J.

FiN. 1791 (1997), report data that are also consistent with both the ex ante separation
hypothesis and the ex post performance hypothesis. They report that the long run

130

THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW

[Vol.2:l

IV. WHY IS THIS AN EQUILIBRIUM?
Taken separately or together, the ex ante selection and ex post performance hypotheses pose the same puzzle. If venture capitalists end up
with the good investments (whether because of expertise in selection or
governance) through the private equity market, and the public ends up
with bad investments through the public equity market, why do public
investors continue to participate in development stage IPOs? How can
the Barry and Turki data represent an equilibrium?
I can think of two other circumstances where scholars have sought
to understand an equilibrium in which market participants continued
making systematically unfavorable investments. The first involves the
poor returns to investments in certain high-yield debt securities. Steven
Kaplan and Jeremy Stein analyzed the persistent poor returns to purchasers of subordinated debt issued to finance acquisition in the second
half of the 1980s.2 They concluded that the most likely explanation for
such systematically poor performance by investment professionals was
agency costs by the officers of savings and loan and insurance companies
which were the primary purchasers of the securities-persistent poor
performance was apparently a function of disloyalty, not irrationality.
The second circumstance involves the persistence of closed-end mutual fund discounts-that is, the persistence of such funds trading at
prices below the net asset value of their portfolio securities-and the
successful initial public offering of such funds despite a reasonable expectation that an investor in the fund IPO will suffer an immediate drop
in the value of the stock purchased. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler attribute
the discount to noise trading risk, the risk that the price of the closed
end fund security will not reflect its fundamental value because irrational
investors will continue to trade at a price that does not reflect the available public information. 3 The discount represents the return for bearing noise trading risk. In their analysis, individual investors are a proxy
for "stupid" noise traders, and the discount persists because closed end
mutual funds are purchased overwhelmingly by individual investors, not
institutions. Here the problem is investor irrationality.
Taken together, the LBO debt and closed-end fund examples suggest a hypothesis concerning the persistent underperformance of development stage IPOs that involves both disloyalty and irrationality. The
underperformance of IPOs is largely eliminated with companies backed by experienced venture capital investors. They also find that the underperformance phenomenon is strongly related to size, which suggests that the venture backed offerings
are not of development stage companies, reinforcing the characterization that venture capital and IPOs are substitutes in the financing of development stage companies.
' Steven Kaplan & Jeremy Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial
Structure (or What Went Wrong in the 1980s), 108 Q.J. EcoN. 313 (1993).
" Charles Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46J. FIN. 75
(1991).
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hypothesis is that noise traders can be sold poor investments by overreaching underwriters-the disloyalty component. The fact that the underwriters in the Barry and Turki sample were generally of low quality
provides support for this hypothesis.
Some light can be shed on this explanation for the persistence of so
peculiar an equilibrium by looking at who owns the shares issued in development stage IPOs a few days after the offering.24 Should the longterm underperformance of development stage IPOs be suffered largely
by individual investors-the noise trading/irrationality componentthen interesting questions arise concerning both existing disclosure and
suitability standards under the federal securities laws.
In all events, the analysis of the equilibrium puzzle concerning the
long-term underperformance of development stage IPOs brings me back
to the subject which I began this comment on Barry and Turki's interesting article: the useful interaction between empirical and analytic scholarship. I expect the authors' continuing empirical examination of their
samples will shed some further light on this fascinating problem.

24

The lag would take into account the potential flipping of shares be institu-

tional investors.

